Abstract: Due to the lack of data and experience with designing buildings for a bioterrorism hazard, it is important for civil engineering professionals to understand both the way that risk is currently accounted for in the design of a building for a bioterrorism hazard and the methods for analyzing risks to buildings that can be borrowed from risk analysis professionals. This paper provides a literature survey of four subject areas dealing with the risk analysis of bioterrorism applied to buildings: ͑1͒ perception of the risk of bioterrorism; ͑2͒ risk analysis of bioterrorism; ͑3͒ risk management of bioterrorism risks; and ͑4͒ risk communication of bioterrorism risks, and includes an example of a simple risk analysis process for a hypothetical building. Bioterrorism presents building design engineers with new challenges. It is a very unpredictable hazard, and very little data exist to guide building designers and decision makers in protecting buildings from this hazard. Designing a building with bioterrorist attacks in mind involves many different disciplines, including, for example, structural, mechanical, and electrical engineering, architecture, landscape architecture, security design professions, and law enforcement. Large consequences are possible in the event of a successful attack, and many building design engineers have little or no experience with defending against a bioterrorist attack. It is important that a reasonable process for analyzing and dealing with these risks be established, and that the process include issues of risk perception and communication within the risk analysis framework.
Introduction
Bioterrorism presents design engineers with new challenges due to the unpredictable nature of the hazard, the lack of data in regard to probabilities of occurrence, and a lack of experience with countering bioterrorist attacks. New and unfamiliar threats such as bioterrorism require a careful examination of the risks presented to buildings. For this reason, it is important for civil engineers to be aware of the basic processes of risk analysis and risk management as related to bioterrorism. Before an issue such as bioterrorism mitigation can be addressed, it is necessary to understand the potential threats and risks associated with it.
Four aspects of the bioterrorism risk to buildings will be discussed in this paper. The first aspect addressed will be the perception of the risk of bioterrorism, followed by discussions of risk analysis and risk management as related to bioterrorism, and finally risk communication of bioterrorism risks.
Bioterrorism has been widely discussed in relation to buildings in recent years. The acquisition of bioagents and the threat of their use by terrorist groups have been on the increase in recent years ͑Kortepeter et al. 2001͒ , and the threat of bioterrorism is predicted to increase in coming years ͑Frist 2002͒. More biological weapons and expertise are available to state and nonstate groups since the discontinuation of the former Soviet Union's biological weapons program ͑Abilek 1999͒. Evidence of terrorist groups' interest in developing bioterrorism agents has been uncovered ͑Glover 2002͒; according to The 9/11 Commission Report, ͑Kean and Hamilton 2004͒, terrorists in Afghanistan may have even been given training in placing toxic agents near building air intakes.
Haas ͑2002͒ defines bioterrorism as "the intentional or threatened use of viruses, bacteria, fungi, or toxins from living organisms to produce death or disease in humans, animals, or plants. " Zilinskas et al. ͑2004͒ describe bioterrorism as involving "the use of pathogens or toxins against human, animal, or plant populations by a terrorist group to achieve political, social, or religious aims." Highlighting the importance of threatened attacks, Hall et al. ͑2003͒ list consequences of bioterrorism events in addition to death and sickness of directly affected victims. These effects include "fear and terror instilled in the public's psyche, the loss of one's sense of personal and community safety, and the disruption of critical social infrastructure that can cripple a nation's economy and leadership." For the purposes of this paper, bioterrorism will refer to a malicious attack on a building using a biological agent as a weapon for the purposes of creating casualties or fear among the occupants.
Historical Summary
Between 1900 and 2004 there were 77 catalogued biological terrorist events, of which only 4 events ͑all post-1945͒ generated more than 10 casualties ͑Zilinskas et al. 2004͒ . Other attacks in the past century with larger effects have straddled the line between bioterrorism and biowarfare. When biological weapons are used indiscriminately against civilian populations or in an attempt to demoralize an enemy, it can be difficult to differentiate this act from bioterrorism. These types of attacks occurred during both world wars, as well as during smaller regional conflicts since then. A number of threats and foiled plots arose in the United States in the 1970s, and in 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan made unsuccessful attempts to use biological agents such as anthrax, ebola, and botulism on 10 occasions, in addition to their well-known attack on the Tokyo subway with the chemical agent sarin ͑AZDHS 2005͒. One of the most recent and well-known bioterrorist attacks in the United States was the Rajneeshee cult salmonella attack on salad bars in Oregon in 1984, in which no deaths resulted but over 750 people became ill ͑Decker 2001͒. This attack was not directed against a building but since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , and the ensuing anthrax attacks of September and October 2001, concern has grown over the potential for bioterrorism attacks against buildings. A warning from the United States government has stated that "the ventilation systems of buildings are an ideal target for bioterrorism" ͑HWRC 2004͒. Tucker ͑1999͒ provides another good discussion of the historical trends in bioterrorism.
Bioterrorism Scenarios
Determining bioterrorism attack scenarios involves three basic uncertainties. The first is the medium of delivery, which could include attacks on the building's air, food, or water. The second basic uncertainty involves where the attack would take place, with the two broadest categories being inside or outside the building. Third, the bioagent that would be used in an attack is uncertain.
There are four potential types of locations for an airborne attack on an office building: ͑1͒ an outside-air release, ͑2͒ a release in the building's air intakes, ͑3͒ a release in the building's air handling unit ͑AHU͒, and ͑4͒ a release in a general area of a building ͑Kowalski and Bahnfleth 2003͒. These four attack locations are different in regard to security and mitigation methods. Different security measures are necessary to prevent each, and different technologies and procedures are used to mitigate the effects of each of these four attack scenarios. The most potentially dangerous scenario for a bioterrorist attack on a building involves introducing an aerosolized bioagent into a building's air handling system ͑Glover 2002͒.
The Centers for Disease Prevention and Control ͑CDC͒ list their agents of highest concern in category A: anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers ͑e.g., ebola͒ ͑CDC 2006͒. The four biological agents most likely to be used as weapons in a bioterrorist attack on a building include ͑1͒ anthrax; ͑2͒ plague; ͑3͒ botulism; and ͑4͒ smallpox ͑Olds 2001͒. There are three primary air-cleaning technologies for defense against potential attacks: ͑1͒ air purging; ͑2͒ filtration; and ͑3͒ ultraviolet germicidal irradiation ͑UVGI͒ ͑Kowalski and Bahnfleth 2003͒. There are currently no feasible systems to detect or identify multiple biological agents in real time. Glover ͑2002͒ discusses the limitations and developments in bioagent detector technology.
In addition to the airborne delivery route, the Oxford Textbook of Public Health ͑Sorvillo et al. 2002͒ lists water, food, injection, infected vectors, and mailed envelopes as possible routes of bioterrorist attack. Injection and infected vectors have limited applicability to attacks directed against a building ͑Sorvillo et al. 2002͒ . Water systems present difficult challenges for potential attackers. Most municipal water systems are already treated by disinfection and filtration to remove biological agents ͑Carus 1997͒ and are so large that dilution would aid in protecting the water supply ͑Sorvillo et al. 2002͒.
These difficulties, along with any desire to target a specific building, would require attackers to attempt to secretly infect the water supply downstream of the treatment facilities, and potentially even downstream of the water main. However, this would be difficult as well, as water supply systems are generally pressurized and would be difficult to penetrate. Pressure would drop, and the water pressure at a breach would hamper efforts to add the contaminant to the water supply. Buildings that store their own water would be more susceptible to this type of attack, but could add their own treatment systems as well as increase security of the internal reservoir ͑Kowalski 2003͒. In the case that a building's water supply is attacked, basic guidelines have been established to utilize alternative procedures for water use ͑CFP 2006͒.
Foodborne attacks have been attempted in the past ͑Carus 1997͒. Many foodborne agents, however, are "already considered to be part of the 'normal flora' of raw foods" ͑Sorvillo et al. 2002͒ . Thus, normal cooking of food will be sufficient to protect against these types of agents. Terrorists would be forced to turn their attention to foods that are eaten raw, or to contaminate the food after cooking ͑Carus 1997͒. Physical security and monitoring of the food supply in a building are the only practical means of protecting against these types of attacks ͑Kowalski 2003͒. It would be important, as well, to deal with an experienced food supplier to ensure the integrity of the food that arrives at the building.
While it may be impractical, if not impossible, to protect a building against every extreme event or terrorist attack, it is definitely possible to design safer, cost-effective buildings ͑Glover 2000͒, especially if designers are equipped with a quantifiable and useful assessment of the risks faced by a given building.
Risk Perception and Bioterrorism in Buildings
The bioterrorism hazard has all the classic features of a dread and unknown risk. This causes an accompanying increase in public fear and anxiety in regard to the threat of an attack. Since biological agents are generally imperceptible to humans and may have delayed or persistent effects, individuals have difficulty assessing the risk posed by these agents. This difficulty "heightens a sense of vulnerability, loss of control, and anxiety" ͑Hall et al. 2003͒. Contagiousness and extremely unpleasant symptoms can make the threat seem even more horrible, which causes decisions made by the public to be influenced by their perceptions of the risk. Kunreuther ͑2002͒ describes this phenomenon: "rather than basing one's choices simply on the likelihood and consequences of different events, as normative models of decision making suggest one do, individuals are also influenced in their choices by emotional factors." Risk perception issues are especially salient in the context of a bioterrorist attack against a building, since a building is generally an enclosed and conditioned space with a relatively large number of occupants. An attack with an agent imperceptible to humans could conceivably take place without being noticed until too late, when fatalities could be unpreventable. Slovic et al. ͑1979a ,b͒ present a table of psychometric risk factors, which are summarized in Fig. 1 . These are factors that define a level of dread and unknown risk and lead to a disparity between the perception of a risk's severity and its absolute severity. Discussion of the psychometric risk factors associated with bioterrorism focuses on its nature as an uncontrollable, inequitable, involuntary, unobservable, effect-delayed new risk with high potential for fatal and catastrophic consequences ͑Haas 2002͒. As it is described above, the bioterrorism hazard falls toward the right ͑"dread"͒ end of all eight risk factor ranges shown in Fig. 1 . This is indicative of the dread and fear that people feel in relation to the risk of a bioterrorist attack that may exceed what would be expected from a purely objective, mathematical examination of the level of absolute risk ͑probability of occurrenceϫconsequences͒ associated with such an attack ͑Thompson and Bank 2007͒. Haas ͑2002͒ also went on to add that "a further dimension of blame . . . has been found to amplify perception of risk."
A great deal of effort is being concentrated on research and on preparing facilities for a bioterrorist attack. This is due in part to the perception of bioterrorist attacks as a dread hazard. The public's fears may be further enhanced by the tendency of both planners and media outlets to concentrate on worst-case scenarios, contributing to the advancement of the availability heuristic perceptions of the risks of bioterrorism ͑CIDM 1998͒. The availability heuristic is a method of accessing mental information where items that are recent or vivid ͑particularly frightening͒ are the first to come to mind.
Concentration on worst-case scenarios also contributes to a phenomenon called probability neglect among the public. Probability neglect occurs when a particular hazard elicits strong emotions; people then tend to focus on catastrophic potential consequences rather than on the small probability of those consequences occurring. This is one reason that people tend to be more worried about risks from terrorism than other, more mundane but statistically more dangerous hazards ͑Sunstein 2003͒.
The effect of probability neglect in the context of bioterrorism risks is illustrated by the data from Barrett ͑2005͒ summarized in Fig. 2 . The figure shows the annual probability of dying in the United States from various causes, including bioterrorism ͑Barrett 2005͒, indicating that the risk of death resulting from a bioterrorist attack is a very small number ͑approximately 1 in 56.5 million͒. However, it can certainly be argued that factors affecting the likelihood of a bioterrorist attack are changing. These include, for example, the motivation of terrorist groups, the availability of biological agents, and the technology for delivery and defense ͑Carus 1997͒.
Issues of risk perception can affect the level of concern over a hazard, such as bioterrorism, and can affect the level of protection desired. Risk analysis for dread hazards such as bioterrorism should reflect the "need to incorporate the data from risk assessment studies and the factors that have been shown to influence 
Risk Analysis and Bioterrorism in Buildings
One of the reasons that bioterrorism instills fear and anxiety in the population, despite its low occurrence rate, is that it is a highly uncertain phenomenon. Uncertainty is a concept that generally creates anxiety for people ͑CIDM 1998͒. It is an inherent characteristic of the bioterrorism hazard that no matter how much preparation is undertaken, there will never be any certainty that every possible bioterrorism threat has been considered, or that those scenarios that have been considered have been correctly and exhaustively characterized ͑Decker 2001͒.
With such emotional and fearful public perceptions of the threat of bioterrorism, it becomes imperative that a careful, logical risk analysis approach be used to estimate the actual levels of risk from bioterrorist attacks and the appropriate responses to the risk. The term risk analysis will be used in this paper to refer to the entire process of attempting to quantify the risk of a bioterrorist attack on a building. Techniques for risk analysis used in the bioterrorism field include a broad range of procedures, such as hazard identification, threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, hazard frequency analysis, and criticality assessment ͑or estimation of consequences͒. Application of these techniques to building design is increasing in importance.
Since risk is generally defined to be the product of the consequences of an event's occurrence and the probability of that event occurring, a risk analysis is composed of some or all of these procedures, but must consist of four basic pieces: ͑1͒ a method to determine the possible attack scenarios ͑threats͒ and/or an assessment of a facility's vulnerabilities; ͑2͒ an examination of the likelihood of the occurrence of various scenarios and/or of the exploitation of the various vulnerabilities assessed; ͑3͒ a determination of the potential consequences of the given scenarios; and ͑4͒ a method for combining the information from the first three steps. These are the common features in each of the techniques described below.
An analyst would require data about terrorist groups' motives, capabilities, and resources, as well as characteristics of the intended target, to determine the occurrence ͑frequency͒ of various attack scenarios. These data would allow for hazard identification, exposure ͑consequence͒ estimation, and assessment of the probability of harm. Such data are difficult to find at best, and most simply do not exist, but potential methodologies do exist in the literature. A risk analysis could be done in two stages ͑Zilinskas et al. 2004͒: first, a qualitative vulnerability assessment, and second, a risk estimation based on a more quantitative process. Since reliable data on frequency of occurrence do not exist, a threat assessment and a vulnerability assessment to elucidate possible scenarios become more important for risk analysis, along with assumptions and judgments. Calibration and validation of risk analysis models become much more difficult in this situation ͑Zilinskas et al. 2004͒.
Reddy and Fierko ͑2004͒ also discuss a methodology for performing a comprehensive quantitative risk analysis for existing buildings. They divide buildings into 12 major categories based on occupancy. Their risk analysis methodology approaches the problem from the point of view of building owners. Owners are concerned not only with casualties, but also with the physical building and the financial impacts on the operation of the building ͑operating costs͒, and in particular with short-term exposures and risks as opposed to long-term exposures. The method utilizes the steps of a public health risk analysis. Hazard identification is used to describe health effects that are the result of human exposure to possible hazards, and a dose-response assessment is used to correlate the amount of time of the exposure to the rate of infection or sickness.
These two steps comprise a threat assessment and a vulnerability assessment, respectively. The consequence assessment portion of Reddy and Fierko's method is called exposure assessment, which is used to determine the size and nature of the population exposed, how they could be exposed, and the expected amount and total time of exposure. Finally, the risk characterization step integrates the information from the first three steps to calculate the implications for the general public's health and the variability and uncertainty in the analysis. This four-step method again relies on data that may not be readily available and on a method for identifying hazards that cannot be expected to result in comprehensive coverage of all possible ͑or even relatively likely͒ scenarios, due to the changing and "creative" nature of the bioterrorism hazard.
The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and AirConditioning Engineers ͑ASHRAE͒ has developed a four-step approach to managing the risk of bioterrorist attacks as well: ͑1͒ risk analysis; ͑2͒ risk treatment planning; ͑3͒ risk treatment plan implementation; and ͑4͒ reevaluating the plan after implementation and modifying it as needed. Risk analysis activities include, as discussed above, identifying threats, determining value of probable losses, and determining system vulnerabilities. Risk treatment planning consists of identifying options for mitigation of the risks and vulnerabilities of the building. In the risk treatment plan implementation step, options are prioritized, a plan developed, and the appropriate actions taken. Then, in the fourth step, the system is reevaluated from time to time to ensure that the owners' needs continue to be met ͑ASHRAE 2003͒. In the terminology of the current discussion, these last three steps make up what we call risk management, as discussed below.
Sandia National Laboratories ͑SNL 2005͒ has also developed a risk assessment methodology for communities ͑RAM-C͒. Using this method, communities identify and prioritize potential targets and threats, evaluate vulnerabilities, determine possible consequences, evaluate target-specific risks, and develop options for mitigating that risk. This method focuses on assessing risks on a community-wide level, not on a building-specific level ͑Jaeger 2004͒.
Many existing bioterrorism risk analyses and contingency plans depend on so-called worst-case scenarios for attacks. One problem with these worst-case scenarios is that they "tend to focus on vulnerabilities, which are virtually unlimited" ͑Decker 2001͒. This can result in wasting of mitigation resources, as probabilities of occurrence are largely ignored. This difficulty can be enhanced by the risk perception issues discussed above but can be reduced by identifying and assessing threats as well as vulnerabilities, which can also help to more effectively manage resources to counter bioterrorist attacks.
Some of the objectives of a risk analysis are to assess and prioritize potential vulnerabilities and to determine what impact a proposed mitigation measure may have on the overall risks. A general schematic of a useful bioterrorism risk analysis for a building is shown in Fig. 3 . The process begins with scenario identification, which may involve a brainstorming or "tabletop" type of exercise ͑Haas 2002͒. Scenario identification involves both a threat and a vulnerability assessment, which could, for example, take the form of a qualitative event tree analysis. If the "potentially successful attack" stage is reached, a hazard frequency analysis can then be performed for the scenario to determine probabilities of occurrence for the various threat scenarios. This analysis can be guided by the threat and vulnerability analyses performed when identifying the scenario. Tools such as event trees may be utilized for specific scenarios, since a number of occurrences must take place in order for an attack to succeed.
For example, for an attack to succeed there must be a motivated terrorist group to plan an attack, a motive for the choice of the building as a target, a technically and logistically feasible bioagent available for use in the attack, and a vulnerability in the building's defenses. Fig. 3 shows how an event tree analysis can be integrated into a risk analysis framework. A consequence analysis can then be performed and combined with the frequency analysis to estimate the risk for a given scenario. Finally, the consequence analysis must be reconsidered in light of the risk perceptions associated with the hazard in developing the final risk analysis. Bioterrorism is a hazard involving strong emotions and possibilities for large-consequence events. The final risk analysis must use the numbers produced in the calculation of risk from frequency and consequence, but it must also be informed by the perception of risk ͑both the public/users' and the analyst/owner's perception͒.
Risk Analysis: Threat and Vulnerability Assessment
Threat assessments and vulnerability assessments basically examine the problem of risk analysis from complementary points of view. While a threat assessment examines the various possibilities for attack, a vulnerability assessment explores the potential gaps in a facility's defenses. Both types of assessment require a cataloging of targets in the building. Targets in a building are physical, human, and financial. Physical risks are risks to property, including the physical building envelope, the building contents, the indoor environment ͑air contamination͒, and the building systems ͓heating, ventilation, and air conditioning ͑HVAC͒, elevators, lighting, mechanical, and electrical͔. Human risks to occupants include both short-term ͑e.g., death, disability͒ and long-term ͑e.g., disability, burns, chronic illness͒ risks. Finally, financial risks refer to revenue loss from decontamination, operating costs, lost business, and utility costs ͑Reddy and Fierko 2004͒.
Threat Assessment
This "decision support tool . . . helps to establish and prioritize security-program requirements, planning and resource allocations" ͑Decker 2001͒. Threat assessments are based on the best available information relating to the capabilities, motives, and potential for damage represented by a given bioterrorism risk. An important element of a threat assessment is a careful consideration of the possible bioagents and dispersal methods available to attackers and likely to be used. The difficulty with a threat assessment is in finding the data to model these capabilities, motives, and damage potentials and in identifying a wide enough array of possible threat scenarios. On the other side of the issue is the problem of being able to determine the point beyond which attack scenarios cease to be feasible for the attackers.
One possible method for assessing threats is to examine terrorism statistics. Hughart and Bashor ͑1999͒ reported that 75% of domestic terrorist incidents occurred in two regions of the country, 86% of domestic terror groups focused on narrowly defined political issues with potential targets that could be identified in advance of an incident, and 43% of targets were private businesses while 50% were government entities. Admittedly, domestic terrorism is different in many important respects from international terrorism in terms of goals, methods of operation, and targets. However, a similar analysis could be done of terrorism in a more general sense, or of bioterrorism in a more narrow sense. This is not enough for a threat assessment, but a study such as this can give a starting point for enumerating potential types of attacks and may also be useful in determining the likelihood of such attacks for particular types of buildings in particular locations. Shahar ͑2005͒ details one target-specific method to assess threats against buildings, using historical data on the intent and actions of various terrorist groups as well as factors that attempt to capture the attractiveness of the building as a target. This method requires subjective input as well, and is proposed as a means to visualize data and trends related to building threats.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ͑FEMA 2003͒ lists five factors to be examined during a threat assessment: ͑1͒ existence of motivated potential actors; ͑2͒ capability of potential actors; ͑3͒ history of potential actors and their actions; ͑4͒ intention, or what the potential actors might hope to achieve; and ͑5͒ targeting, or whether there is a known, specific threat against the building.
Vulnerability Assessment
This tool "identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by terrorists and suggests options to eliminate or mitigate those weaknesses" ͑Decker 2001͒. The only way to extract useful information from a vulnerability assessment is to narrow the focus of the assessment to a very specifically defined population or discrete facility. The assessment would then focus on the assets the owner desired to protect and the exposure pathways that might be available to attackers. A typical office building presents a limited number of exposure pathways or access points. As discussed above, these pathways could include the air handling unit, the food system, water systems, mail system, or occupant entry system.
For example, of the four scenarios described by Kowalski and Bahnfleth ͑2003͒ ͑outside-air release, release in air intakes, release in the AHU, and release in a general area of a building͒, a release into air intakes would arguably be the easiest scenario for terrorists to achieve. In this scenario, the terrorist act would be difficult to prevent at the time of the attack, and the agent would be quickly and effectively distributed throughout the building. However, AHU filters could mitigate this threat considerably, as well as simple design and security precautions such as placing the air intakes in inaccessible locations and providing security ͑e.g., locks, guards, and security cameras͒ for the mechanical equipment room. In a general area release there would be high concentrations in the vicinity of the release, but these concentrations would be much lower elsewhere.
Perhaps the most damaging scenario would be a release in the AHU downstream of the air filters. This scenario would produce the highest concentration of contaminants in the greatest area of the building but is relatively easy to prevent by restricting access to mechanical equipment rooms. For an outside release the filters on the air intakes would reduce concentrations on the first pass, and filters in the AHU would reduce concentrations during recirculation. Additionally, if the agent were detected, intakes could be closed, which would prevent further entrance of contaminants and enhance recirculation filtration ͑Kowalski and Bahnfleth 2003͒.
Hughart and Bashor ͑1999͒ examine the idea of exposure pathways in more depth. They list five components of a potential exposure pathway: ͑1͒ source of the agent; ͑2͒ delivery methods; ͑3͒ potential targets; ͑4͒ exposure routes or means of affecting the exposed population ͑inhalation, ingestion, dermal, etc.͒; and ͑5͒ receptor populations, including particularly sensitive groups of subpopulations. This discussion centers on chemical attacks or accidents in communities, but is conceptually extensible to building attack scenarios. Any time all five of these components have the potential to coincide, the scenario becomes a higher priority.
A scenario that includes a potential target, with potential receptors, a potential source of a bioagent, a delivery method for that agent, and one or more exposure routes available for entering the building and infecting the occupants, requires a more in-depth threat assessment, criticality assessment, and frequency analysis. If one of the components is missing ͑e.g., a building is standing empty, has a high-efficiency filter and ultraviolet protection system, or has no access for nonemployees͒, then this scenario would receive lower priority for mitigation.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ͑USACE 2001͒ recommends a "building survey to determine what protective actions are practical for the building." This building survey then is used not only to develop a vulnerability assessment, but can also be used in developing risk management policies and protocols.
Finally, another potential method for creating a vulnerability assessment may be through the use of a building system interaction model, using the system dynamics model ͓see, for example, ͑Dauelsberg and Outkin 2005͔͒. This would be facilitated through creation of a model to simulate the interactions among the various systems in a building, and then simulating a disruption of one or more of these systems ͑e.g., by a terrorist attack͒. Relative levels of vulnerability to various types of attacks could be simulated, as well as various defensive measures, to determine the most potentially vulnerable points in the building.
Risk Analysis: Hazard Frequency Analysis
A hazard frequency analysis ͑which could also be called a hazard event probability analysis͒ is probably the most difficult portion of a risk analysis for bioterrorism, since there is very little basis for calculating probabilities of bioterrorism events. There are, however, methods to obtain order-of-magnitude estimates for probabilities, including such procedures as expert elicitation, professional judgment, and bounding value ͑best-case/worst-case scenarios͒ assumptions for probabilities ͑Zilinskas et al. 2004͒.
Reddy and Fierko ͑2004͒ argue that event probabilities are best represented by absolute annual probabilities and a distribution to characterize the uncertainty of these probabilities. The Poisson distribution could be used to model these rare events, but there then remains the task of determining the parameter for the distribution being used. The uncertainty in the occurrence probabilities may be characterized with Monte Carlo simulation methods ͑Reddy and Fierko 2004͒. However, Haas ͑2002͒ argues that the probability of a bioterrorism event can only be calculated conditionally, based on the existence of a terrorist with the motivation to commit the act of bioterrorism under consideration. Much work remains to be done in the area of calculating probabilities of occurrence for bioterrorism attacks.
Risk Analysis: Consequence Analysis
The consequence analysis is the assessment of the consequences of a possible bioterrorist attack. Consequences of a given bioterrorist attack scenario can be evaluated in a manner similar to other microbial risk analyses, and accepted frameworks exist for these types of risk analyses ͑Haas 2002͒. However, this presupposes that threat and vulnerability assessments have been completed, which will allow for a dose-response or epidemiological risk analysis to determine the consequences ͑casualties͒ of the given scenario. The threat and vulnerability assessments will produce an estimate of the amount of contaminant that will be present in various portions of the building and can thus be used to determine the exposures of the various members of the building population, allowing for a more traditional dose-response assessment to determine numbers and severity of casualties.
A consequence analysis ͑also sometimes called a criticality assessment͒ should take into account all of a building's assets. This includes entities comprising all three types of targets in a building ͑physical, human, and financial͒. A criticality assessment should "systematically identify and evaluate an organization's assets based on the importance of its mission or function, the group of people at risk, or the significance of a structure" ͑Decker 2001͒. While most building owners would value the human assets of their building much more in a bioterrorism attack than the physical and financial assets, these assets must also be considered when estimating the consequences of a potential bioterrorist attack. Damage to facilities such as HVAC systems and equipment must be considered, as well as cleanup and decontamination costs. Cleanup and decontamination will also lead to business downtime if the building must be closed during the process. These consequences must all be included when performing a criticality or consequence analysis.
Risk Analysis: Risk Calculation
Once the vulnerability and/or threat assessment, hazard frequency analysis, and consequence analysis are completed, risk values can be calculated for each of the threat scenarios. These values can additionally be informed by the potential consequences and the risk perceptions of each scenario. For instance, FEMA ͑2003͒ includes in its risk management methodology a ranking of "potential for collateral damage ͑mass casualties͒." This score is included in the building's overall risk analysis. A ranking system like this could be developed based on various risk perception factors.
The scenarios can then be ranked from highest to lowest risk in order to prioritize spending and efforts for threat mitigation. The scenarios ranked the highest will be those with the most likely threat scenarios that put the most important assets in the most jeopardy ͑Decker 2001͒. A risk-ranking system is really the best possible achievement at present because this type of output will certainly be more realistic, given the constraints on the data used as input, than an output of absolute risk values.
It is important to reemphasize that terrorism is not a static design load. There is no way to create an exhaustive list of potential attack scenarios, and terrorists by their nature continue to search for new vulnerabilities, new means of attack, and new exposure pathways. Therefore, risk analyses for bioterrorism must not be one-time events; there must be a regular process for updating bioterrorism risk analyses based on new and emerging technologies, methodologies, threats, and vulnerabilities ͑Zilinskas et al. 2004͒.
Risk Analysis: Example
As a simple hypothetical example, assume that a building owner intends to assess the risk of a bioterrorist attack on its facility. During the scenario identification step, let us assume that a motivated terrorist group exists. Then, say the best expert opinion is that this group could obtain a particular usable bioagent weapon ͑say, weaponized anthrax͒. Assume further that the building is a highly populated, high-profile building in New York City, making it a potential desired target of the terrorist group. This is the threat assessment from Fig. 3 . Then, say a vulnerability assessment is performed, the results of which show a that a terrorist attack using weaponized anthrax would have some chance of breaching the building's defenses ͑the vulnerability assessment itself could take the form of a second event tree, including steps such as avoidance of capture prior to the attack, access to the building, access to the air intake, bypassing of intake filters, etc.͒. This chain of analyses has brought us to the potentially successful attack stage in Fig. 3 , which indicates that a hazard analysis is warranted.
In order to illustrate a hazard analysis, we will assume that the best expert opinion of the hypothetical terrorist group obtaining weaponized anthrax is 5%, and that the attractiveness of the building being a highly populated, high-profile building in New York City results in a 5% chance that it will be chosen as a desirable target by the terrorist group. Finally, assume that a vulnerability assessment results in a 1% chance of an attack using weaponized anthrax breaching the building's defenses. These simple assumptions result in a threat assessment probability P͑Threat͒ as in Eq. ͑1͒ 
͑1͒
For simplicity, assume that our variables are independent ͑in fact, they will not be independent; for example, the attractiveness of the building as a target would depend on the vulnerability of the building͒.
P͑Successful Attack͒ = P͑Threat͒ ‫ء‬ P͑Vulnerability͒ = 0.0025 ‫ء‬ 0.01 = 0.000025 ͑2͒ So, the probability of a successful attack given by Eq. ͑2͒ is equal to 0.000025, or 1:40,000. The next step in this example is to perform a consequence analysis based on the scenario identified as leading to a potentially successful attack. For this example, assume a best estimate of the consequences of an attack would be 50 deaths, 300 infected, $1,000,000 in cleanup and decontamination costs, and $5,000,000 in loss of business costs. From an economic standpoint, assume a hypothetical insurance value of $1,000,000 per death and $400,000 per infected occupant. This would give an economic cost of $1,000,000+ $ 5,000,000+ $ ‫ء000,000,1‬ 50 + $ ‫ء000,004‬ 300= $ 176,000,000. Calculating the risk through a purely expected value analysis, then the dollar value of the expected loss to the building under consideration is equal to ‫ء52000.0‬ $ 176,000,000= $ 4,400.
However, we can finally assume that the building's occupants have expressed anxiety over the possibility of an anthrax attack and that the loss of 50 occupants' lives is totally unacceptable to the building owner, for moral and business reasons. In developing the final risk analysis, the consequence analysis must be examined again in terms of the nonmonetary consequences and how this risk is perceived by the building owner, occupants, and the general public. Decision analysis methods could be used for assessing the building owner's utility function for occupant casual-ties, and this data then used in the final risk analysis to modify the risk calculated above to determine what protection of the building is really worth to the building owner, and hence what level of resources should be expended to protect it.
Risk Management for Bioterrorism in Buildings
Risk management deals with developing, evaluating, and implementing plans to reduce risks. One of the most common and seemingly most effective methods of risk management for bioterrorism events seems to be what is commonly referred to as a tabletop exercise. These exercises are a type of "war game" for bioterrorist attacks. A scenario is developed, based on previously completed risk analyses that is then acted out by the personnel who would be the players in the event of an actual bioterrorist attack. Since it is impossible to practice with real bioterrorism events, due to their long recurrence intervals and high potential consequences, tabletop exercises are the closest that risk managers are able to come to rehearsing for an actual bioterrorism event.
A number of these types of tabletop exercises have been held, though not all of them related specifically to attacks within a building. The University of Minnesota held an exercise in 2004 to imagine an anthrax attack on campus, with the intent of clarifying the roles of the many players who would be involved with the response to a bioterrorist attack and determining where more planning would be needed. Some of the issues considered concerned risk communication, such as when to go public with the information and who the spokesperson would be. Other issues considered during the exercise included methods for identification and verification of the attack and the agent used, quarantining of affected buildings, identification and treatment of potential victims, and decontamination of affected buildings after identification of the attack. Results indicated to participants that vulnerabilities do exist and that more of these types of exercises would be beneficial ͑Roos 2004͒.
Another example of such a tabletop risk management aid was the "Dark Winter" exercise held in 2001, which was an exercise designed to simulate a covert smallpox attack on the United States ͑not a bioterrorist attack directly on a building or facility͒. Similar to the University of Minnesota exercise, its purpose was to "examine the challenges that senior-level policy makers would face if confronted with a bioterrorist attack" ͑O'Toole et al. 2002͒. These types of exercises are not practical for every building owner, but for large buildings with large numbers of occupants or for a multibuilding campus, these types of exercises may be useful.
Guidelines for risk management of bioterrorist attacks specifically on buildings have been developed as well. For example, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ͑NIOSH͒ and the CDC have issued a guide for protecting buildings from chemical, biological, and radiological attacks ͑NIOSH 2002͒. The risk management steps provided in this guide document include physical security actions, isolation and access control, monitoring/warning devices, personnel security, building information security, planning and coordination among emergency services, building owners, managers, and occupants, and HVAC security steps ͑shutdown, exhaust, filtration procedures, safe rooms, etc.͒. 
These guidelines are a step in the right direction, although many are still very general in nature and do not consider costs. The guidelines are not specific to particular bioagents or attack scenarios, which is appropriate, but they can be refined for specific buildings or building types.
Planning only for the worst-case or highest-consequence scenario is not the most effective way to manage the risks of bioterrorism. It is best to plan for a variety of scenarios, including the more likely, lower-consequence types of scenarios as well as larger, less likely, high-casualty and high-disruption scenarios. This course of action is favored because planning for the worstcase scenario, if it is a highly unlikely scenario, may leave the building open to more likely, lower-consequence attacks, as Powers and Ban ͑2002͒ state clearly:
To date, the driving factor in planning and preparedness has been meeting the threat of catastrophic casualties, without regard for its low probability. However, in our view, the relationship between probability of occurrence and the consequences should be the basis for setting policy. . . . Rather than limiting planning and preparedness to a narrow range of catastrophic scenarios, planning should be based on developing the capability of effectively and efficiently responding to a variety of bioterrorist contingencies.
The idea behind using the relationship between probability of occurrence and consequences for setting policy is that the more ambitious ͑in terms of damage or casualties͒ a terrorist attack is, the more costly and difficult it will be to orchestrate. Therefore, the more unlikely that particular attack is to be attempted and to succeed, and "thus, the level of risk declines as the level of desired casualties increases because the attack scenario becomes less likely . . . , the terrorist is left with relatively few, and very challenging, contingencies for inflicting mass casualties" ͑Powers and Ban 2002͒. According to the classical definition of risk, the level of risk does not necessarily decline as the level of desired casualties increases because, while the probability of success does decrease, the consequences of a successful attack also increase. Instead, the level of risk depends on the relative relationship between the decrease in probability of success and the increase in potential consequences.
However, the point of this argument is valid. To ignore more likely, lower-consequence events in favor of planning exclusively for the higher-consequence, lower-probability worst-case scenario is not likely to be the best course of action. It is not necessarily true that planning for the worst-case scenario will also provide protection from less severe, higher-probability events. Preparations for the worst-case scenario may be ineffective for dealing with the less serious but more likely attacks ͑for example, stocking the wrong type of vaccine͒ and may take resources away from the preparations for more likely lower-consequence attack scenarios ͑Powers and Ban 2002͒.
Thus, while risk perception factors may imply that worst-case planning is most appropriate, these less serious scenarios, which will tend to have a greater probability of occurrence, must also be considered. It is not advisable to ignore either of these types of scenarios when analyzing bioterrorism risks, which is why a rational risk analysis and risk management plan must be utilized in making building design decisions. Finally, when examining the issue of allocation of resources, it is important to remember that hardening or securing one building or one exposure pathway may cause attackers to look for an easier target or delivery method elsewhere ͑Nadel 2002͒.
Risk Communication and Bioterrorism in Buildings
Risk communication for bioterrorism events presents a unique situation for risk communicators. Risk communication is a twoway process, requiring active participation from both the initiator and the audience ͑Aako 2004͒. In this case, risk communication can really be broken up into three separate stages, including communication of risks before a bioterrorist attack, during an attack, and in the aftermath of an attack.
The first stage is the type of communication distributed to the public before an emergency or an attack. This type of communication includes brochures, fact sheets, and Web sites that discuss preparation for an attack. In a building, preattack risk communication involves developing and disseminating a workplace evacuation plan. This plan should include training for building occupants, with floor wardens and backup personnel who are responsible for sounding alarms, helping with evacuations, and taking responsibility during an attack. This training should also include periodic emergency drills and systems to ensure notification, evacuation, and record-keeping for nontraditional and offhours employees.
It is absolutely vital that building occupants have and understand the plan for action in the event of a bioterrorist attack. Knowing what to do in the event of contamination ͑e.g., stay at home, visit a physician͒ is important, and so the preattack risk communication should include fact sheets for "high-priority substances" ͑Hughart and Bashor 1999͒. This includes knowing who is in charge, when to take charge themselves, and where to go for information if an attack does occur ͑Sacks 2004͒. Planning and training must be well thought out and must include input from building users so that the occupants are more likely to follow the plan in the event of an actual emergency ͑CACSH 2004͒.
Sensors to detect bioagents in real time are not yet available ͑Glover 2002͒. High-technology bioagent sensors such as PCR ͑polymerase chain reaction͒ sensors still require 8 to 10 h to detect a "target pathogen" and notify occupants ͑Heller 2003͒. While these sensors will allow infected occupants to seek treatment before symptoms set in, which will greatly decrease fatality rates in many situations, it will be a difficult and perhaps costly task to determine who has been infected. Determining the time of exposure and which occupants were exposed may be impossible. It may be difficult to contact visitors who may have been exposed while in the building, and exposed occupants may have dispersed to their homes or further, expanding the circle of possibly infected persons greatly.
As such, physical security and surveillance take on an even more important role in detecting an attack. Active surveillance for cues to a possible bioterrorist attack must substitute for or complement electronic sensors. These cues could include such things as suspicious activity around an air intake or suspicious containers, or of course an overt threat from a terrorist group ͑Blewett 2004͒. During a bioterrorism emergency that has been detected, the first course of action for occupants should be to notify authorities, activate appropriate alarms, and determine whether to leave the building or shelter in place. Occupants must listen carefully for instructions over the building's public address system ͑OSHA 2003͒.
As an example of the importance of these types of communication in the event of a chaotic terrorist attack situation, six of the nine factors cited as affecting the decision to begin evacuating the World Trade Center ͑WTC͒ towers during the September 11 terrorist attacks ͑Table 1͒ are directly related to risk communication issues ͑CDC 2004͒. Based on this information, it appears that better, more robust and timely risk communication could have improved the evacuation process and would similarly be important in the event of a bioterrorist attack. In the time period following a bioterrorist attack, it is important to provide well-planned public education and information campaigns. These campaigns can improve the public's ability to cope with the stress caused by such an attack by linking "anticipated reactions and behaviors" and should be presented in multiple media forums ͑Hall et al. 2003͒ . If a bioterrorist attack does occur, the public will be required to rely on the media and opinions from medical and scientific experts who may have incomplete, imperfect information about the situation. The experts and the media may disagree on some aspects of the situation, and even on what the best course of action is. This disagreement and apparent confusion could lead to increased public fear and anger ͑Hall et al. 2003͒ .
In addition to any chaos caused by the attacks themselves, communication will be hampered even further by fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety affect people's comprehension of information by decreasing short-term memory capacity, often leading to misunderstandings ͑Keselman et al. 2005͒. Communications will be essential to alert people when a building is safe or to stay away and will also be important to set at ease unexposed building occupants who may be worried about their exposure.
Some of the important characteristics of effective risk communication for bioterrorism events that can help to allay some of this increased public fear and anger include "consistent, accurate information that does not mix reassurance with facts . . . coordinated information sharing, credible scientific authority, a clear news media message, and timely, accurate information from government leaders providing the rationale behind difficult decisions" ͑Hall et al. 2003͒ . Messages in multiple formats are important, but the messages must be completely consistent across the various media to prevent confusion and frustration. Additionally, government leaders, the media, healthcare workers, and scientists must plan to "credibly engage the public to prevent panic, to encourage rapid restoration of community functioning, and to sustain the people's trust" ͑Hall et al. 2003͒. Much of this discussion applies to the occupants of the attacked building as well. These characteristics are also important for a system of communicating with occupants when they are not in the building, as they may be staying home due to illness, fear, or confusion.
Currently, "the underlying premise is that if you issue the correct message through a credible spokesperson, people will respond in an appropriate manner to protect themselves" ͑Sorensen 2004͒. One strategy that has been employed in the past in the development of risk communication plans is the use of focus groups to determine the effectiveness of risk communications. However, focus groups may not be effective at getting "meaningful data about an unfamiliar and largely unthinkable event" such as a bioterrorist attack. This is related to the idea that the basis of much of the current strategy for risk communication may be becoming less appropriate because information sources and technologies are becoming more numerous and more distributed than in the past; cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity is increasing; communications systems are becoming more complex, and thus more vulnerable to disruption; and people who do not use or cannot afford high-technology communications devices are becoming increasingly isolated ͑Sorensen 2004͒.
The research for this paper unearthed discussions of shortcomings and needs in the field of risk communication for bioterrorism. One shortcoming in current procedures is that risk communication issues should be more completely and effectively integrated into tabletop planning exercises for bioterrorist attacks ͑Warner 2004͒. This will allow for more coordination between emergency planners, risk managers, and spokespeople. One shortcoming relates to anticipating questions and concerns that the public will have. It is important to transfer information to the public as soon as possible. In an attack on a building, civil engineers may need to be involved with supplying this type of information. When working with incomplete information, public health officials must avoid the temptation to try to avoid alarming the public. "Delaying comment is what feeds people's anxiety and mistrust, not candor and openness" ͑Warner 2004͒.
This point highlights the need to share information as well as gaps and uncertainties related to that information. It is increasingly important to anticipate the public's need for knowledge and to relay information as it becomes available. Effective risk communication must provide ". . . what the public wants to know to manage their lives throughout the crisis as well as what the public needs to know to be safe" ͑Warner 2004͒. What the public wants to know, in terms of going about their daily business or getting on with their lives, quickly becomes nearly as important as the information they need to provide them with safety. Obviously, safety information needs to take priority, but the other type of information must not be ignored. Sounding the all clear is an important function of risk communication in the case of a bioterrorist attack, to allow for occupants to return to the building without fear.
There are also gaps in the body of research regarding risk communication for bioterrorism attacks. Current research "provides little insight into how the public will behave in bioterrorist events that may be fundamentally different from the events that have been extensively researched" ͑Sorensen 2004͒. Most research has been scenario specific. Work remains to determine how the public will react differently when faced with a bioterrorist attack as opposed to, say, an industrial accident or a sudden volcanic eruption, and to generalize findings regarding bioterrorism from scenario-specific results to overall bioterrorism risk communication findings. Finally, Sandman ͑2003͒ presented a list of topics that should be addressed by researchers to advance the field of risk communication in the area of bioterrorism events, including overreassurance of the public, keeping people occupied during a crisis to check anxiety, when and when not to withhold information, helping people to integrate a sense of the bioterrorist threat into daily routines, the relationship of denial or numbness to panic or apathy, acknowledgment of uncertainty, and the ability to communicate despite this uncertainty.
Conclusion
It is apparent that bioterrorist attacks against buildings are a hazard that may present the risk of considerable damage to the world's population and infrastructure. At the same time, it is unclear just how likely a bioterrorist attack is. There is an undeniable lack of good statistical data on past bioterrorism events, leading to difficulties in estimating probabilities for future events, and there are such a myriad of possible scenarios that it is impossible to characterize each and every one of them. Bioterrorism is also a highly emotional, dread-filled issue that provokes fear and anxiety among much of the general public. These difficult issues create many challenges for building designers, operators, and owners. It is important that a reasonable method be established to assess, manage, and communicate the risks of a bioterrorist attack, and that people's perceptions of these risks be taken into account during the analysis and communication phases. It is also important that planning for bioterrorism events addresses not only large, unlikely catastrophic attacks, but also the more likely threat of smaller, easier to execute attacks. Much work remains to be done in the future to provide a safe, reassuring, risk-appropriate, and cost-effective system for protecting buildings from bioterrorist attacks.
